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The Legal Regulation of Sadomasochism and the So-Called “Rough Sex Defence”
Elaine Craig*
The focus of this article is on the judicial application of Canada’s sexual assault doctrine
in the context of the so called ‘rough sex defence’. Canadian criminal courts have seen an
increased prevalence of legal narratives about S/M in recent years. In particular, courts
are increasingly confronted with individuals who defend themselves against allegations of
sexual assault by claiming that the impugned acts constituted consensual S/M or ‘rough
sex’. The analysis is aimed at illustrating the way in which courts may fail to properly
apply legal doctrine because of a problematic approach to the S/M context in which
allegations arose.
Le présent article porte sur l’application judiciaire de la doctrine canadienne en matière
d’agression sexuelle dans le contexte de la défense dite des « pratiques sexuelles
brutales ». Au cours des dernières années, les tribunaux pénaux canadiens ont constaté
une prévalence accrue des exposés des faits mentionnant des pratiques de
sadomasochisme. En particulier, les tribunaux sont de plus en plus confrontés à des
personnes se défendant contre des allégations d’agression sexuelle en affirmant que les
actes reprochés constituaient du sadomasochisme ou des « pratiques sexuelles brutales »
consensuels. L’analyse vise à illustrer la manière dont les tribunaux peuvent omettre
d’appliquer correctement la doctrine juridique en raison d’une approche problématique à
l’égard du contexte du sadomasochisme duquel les allégations découlent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Media attention, cultural awareness, and rising public interest in experimenting with sadomasochism
(S/M) have led some to proclaim that S/M has gone mainstream.1 Indeed, research suggests that a
substantial minority of the population have fantasized about, or experimented to some degree with, S/M
– or bondage, discipline (or domination), sadism (or submission), and masochism [BDSM], as it is
sometimes called.2
*
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2

Elaine Craig, Professor, Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University. The author would like to thank Lise Gotell for
reviewing an earlier version of this article and sharing her insights. I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers whose
comments undoubtedly improved the article and would like to thank Bailey Selig and Kiran Sharma for their excellent
research assistance. This research was supported by an Insight Grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research
Council.
See Cheryl Hanna, “Sex Is Not a Sport: Consent and Violence in Criminal Law” (2001) 42:2 Boston College L Rev 239
at 243; Margot D Weiss, “Mainstreaming Kink” (2006) 50:2–3 J Homosexuality 103.
See Ashley Brown, Edward Barker & Qazi Rhaman “A Systematic Scoping Review of the Prevalence, Etiological,
Psychological, and Interpersonal Factors Associated with BDSM” (2020) 57:6 J Sex Research 781 at 783; Cara Dunkley
& Lori Brotto, “The Role of Consent in the Context of BDSM” (2020) 32:6 Sexual Abuse 657 at 660; V Coppens et al,
“A Survey on BDSM-related Activities: BDSM Experience Correlates with Age of First Exposure, Interest Profile, and
Role Identity” (2020) 57 J Sex Research 129 at 129 (citing several recent studies). Maneesha Deckha summarizes
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S/M has also hit the courts. Canadian criminal courts have seen an increased prevalence of legal narratives
about S/M in recent years.3 In particular, courts are increasingly confronted with individuals who defend
themselves against allegations of sexual assault by claiming that the impugned acts constituted consensual
S/M or that they honestly, but mistakenly, believed that their accuser had communicated consent to engage
in S/M or “rough sex.” Virtually, all of the Canadian sexual assault case law in which claims about
consensual S/M arise involve allegations that an accused engaged in sexual acts without the complainant’s
consent.4 In other words, as Karen Busby demonstrates in her research, “Canadian case law sees women
going to the police alleging violent sexual assaults, while their partners are raising the defence of
consensual BDSM. … [T]he issue in all of the Canadian sexual assault cases is not the legal question: can
they consent to BDSM? It is the factual question: did they consent to BDSM?”5 This issue might be
characterized as the legal interpretation of the so-called “rough sex defence.” The vast majority of reported
sexual assault cases in which the prospect of consensual “rough sex” is raised have occurred in the past
ten years.6 In the reported case law from twenty years ago, the “rough sex defence” was nowhere to be
found.7
It would be difficult to conclusively explain this rise in reliance on consensual rough sex as a defence
to allegations of sexual assault. Elizabeth Shef argues that “[t]he vast influx of new members to the
subculture has destabilized older norms and values and created more situations in which communication
is poor, consent is unclear, play is unsafe, and people get hurt.”8 This is one explanation. Alternatively, it
may be that the increased prevalence of legal narratives about S/M is more a function of opportunistic
legal strategy than an influx of incompetent new S/M practitioners. Busby hypothesizes that “increased
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descriptions of sadomasochism as follows: “While S/M has varied meanings to its practitioners and eludes precise
definition, it is generally associated with the giving and receiving of pain to incite sexual pleasure in a roleplay/relationship mediated by power.” Maneesha Deckha, “Pain, Pleasure, and Consenting Women: Exploring the
Feminist Response to S/M and Its Legal Regulation in Canada through Jelinek’s The Piano Teacher” (2007) 30 Harv JL
& Gender 425.
Based on a CanLII search conducted 3 April 2021, more than 80 percent of reported cases involving the terms “rough
sex” and “sexual assault” occurred after 2010. Of the thirty-one reported cases that include the terms “sexual assault”
and “BDSM,” only one is prior to 2010 (R v Price, 2004 BCPC 103 (CanLII)). It did not involve a rough sex or
consensual sadomasochism (S/M) defence to sexual assault. There are no reported cases prior to 2010 in which an
accused relied on consensual “sadomasochism” as a defence to sexual assault. There is one case – R v RDW, 2006 BCPC
300 (CanLII), – in which an accused pled guilty to the lesser included offence of assault but relied on the argument that
the incident involved consensual S/M at sentencing.
Karen Busby, “Every Breath You Take: Erotic Asphyxiation, Vengeful Wives, and Other Enduring Myths in Spousal
Sexual Assault Prosecutions” (2012) 24 CJWL 328 at 347. While not exclusively limited to allegations of nonconsensual behaviour, as is the case in Canada, the vast majority of cases appear also to be of this type in other,
comparable, jurisdictions. See e.g. Elizabeth Shef, “Kinky Sex Gone Wrong: Legal Prosecutions Concerning Consent,
Age Play and Death via BDSM” (2021) 50:3Archives of Sexual Behavior 761 at at 763. There have been a very small
number of decisions in the United Kingdom that did involve criminal prosecutions for bondage, discipline (or
domination), sadism (or submission), and masochism (BDSM) in which none of the participants alleged non-consent.
See e.g. R v Brown, [1993] UKHL 19, [1994] 1 AC 212.
Busby, supra note 4 at 347.
Ibid.
Only two reported cases prior to 2000 raise the prospect of a “rough sex defence”: R v Welch (1995), 25 OR (3d) 665
(ON CA); R v RKJ, 1998 CANLII 12252 (NB CA). It is not clear whether the accused in RKJ relied on the couple’s
supposed history of consensual rough sex as a defence. The accused in Welch did rely on the “rough sex defence.”
Shef, supra note 4 at 761.
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social openness to BDSM may [] permit defendants to claim a BDSM practice by relying on judicial
ignorance about BDSM practices and, thereby, raise doubt about consent” in cases in which that doubt is
not warranted.9 Regardless of the explanation, and as I will argue in Parts III and IV, the proliferation of
the “rough sex defence” is dangerous for women.10
A. A Note About Sex Positivity and the Construction of Sex as Dangerous
Feminist reflection on the notion of S/M or consensual “rough sex” requires consideration of the
relationships between protecting human health and safety, preserving personal autonomy, and promoting
the social conditions in which the good of sex might flourish. There exist, for example, tensions between
ensuring legal protection for the sexual integrity of women and the criminalization of consensual sexual
acts on the basis of heteronormative or “vanilla” attitudes about the (un)desirability or worthlessness of
certain marginalized sexual minorities and practices.11 Katherine Franke argues that legal feminists have
focused exclusively on the dangers of sex at the cost of properly recognizing the female body as a site of
pleasure and desire.12 She suggests that implicit in this focus of legal feminism is the problematic
assumption that before sexuality can be explored positively, harmful, dangerous sex must be eliminated.13
Franke juxtaposes legal feminism with feminist work in other disciplines – work that simultaneously
addresses questions of sexuality in both negative and positive terms.14

9
10

11

12
13
14

Busby, supra note 4 at 346.
One of the ways in which legal narratives about rough sex pose a threat to women’s sexual integrity involves erroneously
granted applications to introduce evidence of a complainant’s other sexual activity in cases in which the “rough sex
defence” is invoked. See e.g. R v TJN, [2018] OJ No 429 [TJN] (application to ask complainant whether he had tied her
up in the past and whether it was sometimes with her consent granted); R v DAB (2021), MBQB 6 (CanLII) [DAB]
(application granted on the basis of an expert’s opinion that it was relevant to the mentally ill accused’s state of mind at
the time of the incident); R v Marsden, [2020] OJ No 2217 [Marsden] (denying an application for certiorari to quash the
trial judge’s decision (Wolfe J, 27 January 2020, unreported) to admit evidence of the complainant and the accused
engaging in consensual anal intercourse and BDSM in the past despite his conclusion that he would not have admitted it.
See also Busby, supra note 4 at 332; R v Gravel, 2018 QCCQ 1379. In addition, and equally if not more problematically,
evidence of other sexual activity has also crept into cases involving a rough sex defence without a section 278.92
application. See e.g. Busby, supra note 4 (discussing R v JA, [2011] 2 SCR 440 [JA]).
For an examination of this tension, see Monica Pa, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle: The Criminalization of Consensual
Sadomasochistic Sex” (2001) 11:1 Tex J Women & L 51; Lise Gotell, “Governing Heterosexuality through Specific
Consent: Interrogating the Governmental Effects of R. v. J.A.” (2012) 24:2 CJWL 359; Sharon Cowan, “Criminalizing
SM: Disavowing the Erotic, Instantiating Violence” in Antony Duff et al, eds, The Structures of the Criminal Law
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 59; Ummni Khan, Vicarious Kinks: S/M in the Socio-Legal Imaginary
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014) 225; Vera Bergelson, “The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of
Consent” (2007) 75 Geo Wash L Rev 165; Stear Nils-Hennes, “Sadomasochim as Make Believe” (2009) 24:2 Hypatia
21; Deckha, supra note 2; Hanna, supra note 1. For an argument that society’s paradoxical relationship to sex (sexual
exceptionalism and sex negativity) results in legal regulation that under values sexual autonomy, see Ummni Khan, “Hot
for Kink, Bothered by the Law: BDSM and the Right to Autonomy” (8 August 2016), online: Canadian Bar Association
<www.cba-alberta.org/Publications-Resources/Resources/Law-Matters/Law-Matters-Summer-2016-Issue/Hotfor-Kink,-Bothered-by-the-Law-BDSM-and-the-Rig> [Khan, “Hot for Kink”].
Katherine Franke, “Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, law and Desire” (2001) 101 Colum L Rev 181 at 182.
Ibid.
Ibid at 182.
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I agree that waiting until the dangers of sex have been eliminated to embrace the capacity of sex to
promote human flourishing seems ill advised.15 That said, ensuring that the legal protection of the right
and ability to say no is effectual seems necessary to facilitate and expand women’s capacity to pursue
pleasure – to say yes.16 It is not sufficient to assert that feminists ought to pursue these objectives
simultaneously without recognizing that these objectives are indivisibly overlapping, if not co-extensive.
Both as a matter of theory and practice, S/M seems to throw this circumstance into relief.17
A legal regime that properly and consistently delineates between consensual and non-consensual acts
in adjudicating “rough sex defences” would promote freedom from oppressive, harmful sexual
experiences. Confidence that such a regime was in place would promote women’s freedom to pursue more
sexual creativity and greater exploration of desire. One of the many harms of sexual violence at a structural
level is that it diminishes the capacity of women to seek self-fulfilment, develop identity, and pursue
desire, pleasure, and joy through sex. While Franke’s call to legal feminists to “theorize yes” should be
heeded, it would be foolish not to recognize that the capacity to “say yes” to sex or other erotic activity is
furthered by, and, arguably, even reliant on, the right to “say no.”18
There remains considerable debate within legal feminist communities as to whether the law ought to
vitiate consent to S/M that causes bodily harm. Theorizing “yes” in the context of this debate is important
work. But it is work that cannot be divorced from a recognition that, as it stands, some courts do not
consistently or properly delineate between consensual and non-consensual sex, even absent the types of
activities that cause injury.19 In other words, consideration of the implications for the sexual autonomy of
women posed by laws that limit women’s ability to “say yes” must be informed by, among other things,
the reality that some courts continue to struggle with the “did she consent” question in sexual assault
cases20 and that this struggle may be heightened in cases in which accused individuals invoke S/M, or
consensual “rough sex,” in response to allegations of non-consensual sexual contact.21
…
15

16

17

18
19
20

21

I have examined the failings of a strict good sex/bad sex dichotomy elsewhere. See Elaine Craig, Troubling Sex:
Towards a Legal Theory of Sexual Integrity (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2012).
Franke would arguably agree with this proposition: “[I]t may be that the best we can aspire to, as feminist legal theorists,
is a set of legal analyses, frames, and supports that erect the enabling conditions for sexual pleasure.” Franke, supra note
12 at 208.
In R v Jobidon, (1991) 66 CCC (3d) 454 (SCC) [Jobidon], the Court held that one cannot consent to the infliction of
bodily injury arising from a socially undesirable activity such as a fist fight. The same approach was used in Welch,
supra note 7, in which the accused claimed to have engaged in consensual S/M. In R v Paice, [2005] 1 SCR 339, the
Supreme Court of Canada clarified that the rule in Jobidon stipulated that consent to a fist fight would be vitiated in
circumstances in which the accused intended to, and did, cause bodily harm. In R v Quashie, (2005)198 CCC (3d) 337,
the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that consent is only vitiated if the accused both causes, and subjectively intended
to cause, bodily harm.
Franke, supra note 12.
Busby, supra note 4.
See Jennifer Koshan, “The Judicial Treatment of Marital Rape in Canada: A Post-Criminalisation Case Study” in
Melanie Randall, Jennifer Koshan &Patricia Nyaundi, eds, The Right to Say No: Marital Rape and Law Reform in
Canada, Ghana, Kenya and Malawi (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017) Chapter 9; Melanie Randall, “Sexual Assault Law,
Credibility, and ‘Ideal Victims’: Consent, Resistance, and Victim Blaming” (2010) 22 CJWL 397; Elaine Craig, Putting
Trials on Trial (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2018); Elaine Craig, “Judging Sexual Assault
Trials: Systemic Failure in the Case of Regina v Bassam Al-Rawi” (2017) 95 Can Bar Rev 180.
Busby, supra note 4.
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The focus of this article is on the judicial application of Canada’s sexual assault doctrine in the context
of the “rough sex defence.” One way to pursue this focus is through a close reading of cases in which the
judicial failure to delineate between consensual S/M and sexual assault is clear. An examination of the
trial proceeding and judicial reasoning in R. v Hunter provides this opportunity.22 The reasoning in Hunter,
which involved allegations of sexual assault following a series of consensual acts in the context of a S/M
“scene,” exemplifies this failure.23 Certainly, some courts have avoided these types of mistakes.24
Unfortunately, other decisions reflect errors similar to those found in Hunter.25
The remainder of this article will proceed in four parts. Part II involves a brief explanation of the facts
in Hunter. Relying on the reported decision and the audio recording of the trial itself, Part III examines
the errors in Hunter regarding the actus reus for sexual assault. Part IV shifts the focus to the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court’s erroneous analysis of the mens rea in Hunter. The inquiry in both Part III and Part IV is
aimed at illustrating the way in which the Court failed to properly apply the legal doctrine because of a
problematic approach to the S/M context in which these allegations arose. Part V offers a concluding
summary of the legal principles that must be applied to properly adjudicate a “rough sex defence” in
response to allegations of sexual assault.
Again, confidence in law’s capacity to protect women’s sexual integrity would promote women’s
sexual autonomy. Decisions like the one in Hunter suggest that, at this point, such confidence would be
misplaced. Instead of sending the message “proceed with extreme care, negotiate S/M scenes carefully
and in a detailed way, learn the rules and follow them,” this decision has the opposite effect. While a
detailed doctrinal dissection of a single case is laborious, it should aid future courts in ensuring that the
legal definition of consent in Canada is applied properly, including in cases in which the “rough sex
defence” or notion of consensual S/M is invoked.
II. THE FACTS IN HUNTER
The factual accounts in the overwhelming majority of reported cases in which the “rough sex defence”
is invoked depict incidents that occur in private, involving an accused man and a woman complainant,
and without any mention of membership of either party in an organized or semi-organized S/M
community.26 Hunter is no exception.
22

23
24

25

26

R v Hunter, 2019 NSSC 369 [Hunter].
“Scene” typically refers to a S/M encounter. See Staci Newhmar, “Rethinking Kink: Sadomasochism as Serious Leisure”
(2010) 33 Qualitative Sociology 313 at 315.
For an example of reasoning that interprets and applies the law of consent correctly in a case involving similar
allegations, see R v MacMillan, 2019 ONSC 6018 [Macmillan]. See also R v Davidson, 2010 BCPC 228 (CanLII)
[Davidson].
See e.g. R v AE, Action No 161500723Q1, 10 April 2019, unreported, Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta (on file with
author) [AE]. The acquittals in AE were overturned on appeal: R v AE, 2021 ABCA 172 [AE 2021]. At the time of
writing, this case was before the Supreme Court of Canada. See also R v MS, [2018] OJ No 5258 [MS]; Busby, supra
note 4.
CanLII search of all reported Canadian case law between 1 April 2021 and 31 December 2010 (using the search terms
“sexual assault” and “S/M” or “BDSM” or “sadomasochism”) conducted 1 April 2021. But see R v BTH, 2018 SKQB 85
(CanLII) (section 276 application seeking to introduce evidence that the complainant belonged to a BDSM community
denied). One of the only reported cases to refer to a BDSM community – R v DM, 2018 ONCJ 423 (CanLII) – involved a
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The complainant in Hunter, A.G., had a hearing disability that made it difficult for her to understand a
speaker unless she was lip reading.27 She and the accused arranged through an online messaging
application to meet for a “dominant-submissive type" sexual encounter involving the two of them and
another woman, S.D.28 The accused and the complainant agreed that she would take the bus from Halifax
to Cow Bay, where the accused would pick her up. Due to difficulties with her bus route, it was 10:30
p.m. before Hunter picked her up at the bus stop and drove her to S.D.’s residence, a trailer in a wooded
area of rural Nova Scotia. The complainant had never been to, and was unfamiliar with, this location.29
S.D. was a long-time friend and “somewhat regular” sexual partner of the accused.30 The complainant had
never met S.D. and did not know the accused’s real name. Hunter used a pseudonym in their
communications on the messaging app. The complainant was significantly outweighed by the accused.31
The complainant, Hunter, and S.D. all testified. The only other witness was the investigating officer. The
complainant’s evidence was that the incident began with a series of consensual sexual acts between the
three of them. Her allegation was that, following these consensual acts, the accused engaged in several
acts to which she did not consent. She alleged that he, without her consent, repeatedly choked her with his
penis, slapped her face, grabbed and twisted her breast, and partially strangled her while penetrating her
vagina with his penis. Hunter was charged with sexual assault. He was acquitted.
The trial judge determined that the Crown had failed to prove that the complainant did not consent to
being choked with the accused’s penis or having her breast wrenched painfully. Justice Patrick Duncan
accepted that the complainant did not consent to having the accused place his hands around her throat,
partially constricting her breathing, while penetrating her vagina with his penis. However, he concluded
that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused knew that the complainant did not want to be
partially strangled while he penetrated her vaginally with his penis.32 Despite its multiple legal errors,
Justice Duncan’s decision to acquit was not appealed by the Crown.
III. ACTUS REUS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE “ROUGH SEX DEFENCE”
The complainant’s evidence was that she and S.D. took turns performing oral sex on the accused while
kneeling in front of him. She testified that “he wanted me to have his penis all the way down my throat
until I threw up and I didn’t like that so I was hesitant in letting his penis go all the way back, but I uh, but
it was still consensual. Um, during this point he would also pull on my hair.”33 Following some further
consensual sexual acts between the three, the accused then instructed the complainant to lie on the bed

27
28
29
30
31
32
33

female accused and her husband who were convicted of possessing and creating child pornography. The couple also
engaged in a master-slave relationship that included S/M and membership in a BDSM community.
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 6.
Ibid at para 8.
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 181.
Ibid at para 82.
R v Hunter, Audio Trial Transcript: Testimony of Accused, 26 September 2019, Halifax CRH481783 (NSSC) at
14h:37m:01s [Testimony of Accused].
Hunter, supra note 22.
R v Hunter, Audio Trial Transcript: Testimony of Complainant, 25 September 2019, Halifax CRH481783 (NSSC) at
11h:28m:35s [Testimony of Complainant].
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and hang her head off the edge of the bed. From this position he would be in “complete control” of how
far he could push his penis down her throat.34 A.G. testified that while in this position the accused:
AG: … inserted his penis into my mouth and he went so far back, to the back of my throat,
and I remember feeling like I couldn’t breath [sic] and his stomach was pressed up against
my face, and he …
Q: What were, what were his hands doing?
A: Umm ... I don’t remember.
Q: Okay, carry on.
AG: Umm, so he did this about twice, and I started to panic because I couldn’t breath [sic]
and I lifted my hands up above my head and started to try to push him off me. So I was
pushing on his stomach area to try to push his penis out of my mouth because I could not
breath while he was doing this. Umm … I remember I started to cry, and there were, umm
… visible tears at that point, umm … and then –
Q: And were you … at this point were you consenting to what was going on with the oral
sex, with the insertion of the penis further down your throat so that you couldn’t breathe?
A: No. No.
Q: Okay, carry on Ms. G.
A: So, umm ... he did, after I tried pushing him off of me, he did back his penis out of my
mouth, and I shook my head and I told him “no,” that I did not want to do it any more, and
at this point I was still crying and he slapped me across the face, and the female, she said
“just do it one more time and then Daddy will fuck you again.” Umm ... and then as
response Logan [Hunter] said he won’t go as far down this time and just for me to do it one
more time. Umm ... I did give in and agree because by that point I was feeling scared and
like he wasn’t going to listen to anything I had to say. Umm ... though he did agree and not
go as far down my throat this time. Umm ... this lasted maybe ten minutes.35
S.D. testified under cross-examination that the complainant was “kind of resistant” during the “oral sex.”36
She agreed that she had told the police that the complainant either said “stop” or “no” or otherwise
indicated a lack of consent during the “oral sex.”37

34

35
36

37

Testimony of Complainant, supra note 33 at 11h:33m:02s – 11h:33m:27s. A.G. stated in her testimony: “Eventually he
then instructed me to lay on the bed with my head over the edge of the bed because he wanted to perform oral sex, but
this time when I did that he would be in complete control and I was again hesitant but I did lay on the bed with my head
over the edge.”
Ibid at 11h:33m:31s.
R v Hunter, Audio Trial Transcript: Testimony of S.D., 26 September 2019, Halifax CRH481783 (NSSC) at
11h:16m:00s – 11h:16m:26s [Testimony of S.D.]: “Q: So was there another point then in the evening when during oral
sex she said either stop or no? A: Not those words no. Q: Well what did she say then? A: Not necessarily that she would
have said but more just been like kind of resistant I guess.”
Ibid at 11h:06m:30s – 11h:09m:40s.
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The accused testified that “there were multiple insertions”38 of his penis down the complainant’s throat
and that at “no point did she say no or push against” him.39 He stated that “each time there was a longer
pause between each one because of the gagging. You tend to like lose your breath and you know your
nose becomes stuffy and things so I would give her a break between each insertion.”40 He testified that
each time she’s catching her breath her mouth is not available for oral sex. So you know
she’s breathing heavily and she’s just laying there. That she has to open her mouth wide in
order to actually permit my penis back into her mouth. So there’s just a longer pause each
time before she eventually opened her mouth. But I didn’t threaten her. I didn’t smack her
… and I did not make any threat about, you know, not driving her home or any type of
violence.41
The accused stated that
I did not observe any obvious emotion. Each time that she gagged, like, her face would
turn, you know a shade of red from, like, I guess the gagging or coughing. Its like –
involuntary reflex that, like, you become a little flush and that your eyes may, like, appear,
like, glassy. But I did not see her looking upset or crying or making any sounds that
indicated that she was in any state of discomfort.42
Note the absurdity of testifying that the complainant was gagging and coughing, had lost her breath, her
nose was running, her eyes were glassy, and her face was turning red and then asserting that he did not
see or hear any indication that “she was in any state of discomfort.”43
The Crown’s cross-examination of the accused regarding these acts of choking the complainant with his
penis included the following:
Q: And during this process when you were forcing your penis into her throat there were
times when Ms G. squirmed correct?
A: Yes.
Q: There were times when she gagged?
A: Yes.
Q: There were times when she clearly couldn’t breathe and needed air?
A: Yes.
…

38
39
40
41
42
43

Testimony of Accused, supra note 31 at 11h:36m:03s.
Ibid at 11h:36m:28s.
Ibid at 11h:36m:06s.
Ibid at 11h:36m:35s.
Ibid at 11h:39m:58s.
Ibid.
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Q: And the reason for that particular position with her lying on her bed with her head
[hanging] over the bed is that it allows you to push your penis deeper down her throat than
you would otherwise be able to do?
A: In an upright position it doesn’t, its not able to, go as far, so yes.
Q: And that position also allows you to control [] the situation more. You’re kneeling over
her head as it dangles off the bed. You’re in control of how far the penis goes down her
throat?
A: Yes.
Q: I’m going to suggest to you that Ms G. began crying during this process.
A: I didn’t notice that she was crying. There was no audible sounds that made it seem like
she was crying. There was no, I guess, crying face or like ugly crying … her eyes may have
watered from the actual gagging but it didn’t seem like she was upset and crying.44
The accused told the police “there may have been tears, because when you gag your eyes water and your
nose tends to run. But I wouldn’t say, like, she was crying I guess. It’s just, like, the involuntary response
of coughing that hard or something.”45 When pressed on this point during cross-examination, the accused
agreed that he was simply guessing when he suggested that the tears were from gagging and not because
she was upset or in distress.46
The complainant’s testimony was that she did not, during this interaction in which her head was hung
over the bed and the accused was in “complete control,”47 consent to the insertion of his penis down her
throat so that she could not breathe.48 Despite her evidence that she did not want to be choked by the
accused’s penis, despite S.D.’s evidence that the complainant indicated resistance when the accused was
pushing his penis down her throat, and despite the accused’s evidence that the complainant was squirming,
44
45
46

47
48

Ibid at 14h:18m:13s.
Ibid at 14h:21m:00s (the Crown put this to him during cross-examination).
Ibid at 14h:21m:28s – 14h:21m:57s: “Q: So, Ms. G’s eyes may in fact have been watering as she was gagging. A: That’s
correct. Q: There may have been tears coming from her eyes. A: Yes. Q: And you’re not a mind-reader. A: That’s
correct. Q: You don’t know for sure why there may have been tears from her eyes. You were simply guessing it was
because she was gagging and not because she was upset or in distress. A: That’s a fair assessment.”
Testimony of Complainant, supra note 33 at 11h:33m:02s – 11h:33m:27s.
Ibid at 11h:34m:50s – 11h:35m:00s. The trial judge appears to have misapprehended this aspect of her evidence. He
stated that her evidence was that only “the last act of fellatio, after she said no” was non-consensual (Hunter, supra note
22 at para 15; see also paras 42–43). This is not consistent with the complainant’s testimony. The complainant was asked
by the Crown, in reference to the first incidents of oral penetration while she was in this position on the bed: “Um, and
were you, at this point were you consenting to what was going on with the oral sex – with the insertion of the penis
further down your throat so that you couldn’t breathe?” She responded: “No, no.” Her evidence was that as this was
occurring she could not breathe, panicked, tried to push his penis out of her mouth, and started crying. Later in her
testimony, she stated that during these first instances of oral penetration while in this position on the bed he continued to
penetrate her mouth and throat after she tried to push him away (ibid at 12h:14m:00s). She was asked specifically
whether she was consenting to his penis down her throat from the time she was trying to push him away and she
responded: “no.” She testified that she stopped consenting “when he had his penis all the way down her throat and [she]
tried to push him off.” Her evidence was that it took another minute before he “backed his penis” out of her throat and
mouth (ibid at 12h:15m:45s). During cross-examination, she confirmed that the first time he did this while her head was
hung over the bed he went further than she wanted, and defence counsel characterized her testimony as alleging that all
acts of oral penetration while in this position on the bed were non-consensual (ibid at 2h:36m:00s).
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gagging, coughing, and could not breathe, Duncan J was “not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
A.G. was not consenting to the[se] acts of fellatio.”49 While the trial judge accepted that “at one point she
decided that she did not want to have Mr. Hunter’s penis so deep in her throat that it caused her to gag and
tear,”50 he was left with a reasonable doubt regarding her evidence that she did not consent to any of these
acts while in this position on the bed.
On what basis did the Court in Hunter conclude that the Crown had failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the complainant did not want to be choked with the accused’s penis in this manner while in this
position on the bed? Justice Duncan offered three reasons, each of which included errors.
First, he expressed doubt about “A.G.’s evidence that she attempted to push the accused away.”51 He
reasoned that “if she did that it was not apparent to the accused. This could be explained by the fact that
he is a large man and she may not have used enough force to make her intentions known to him.”52 Pointing
to a woman’s failure to use adequate force to physically resist an accused as evidence of consent seems
perilously close to reliance on the discredited stereotype that “real victims fight back.”53
In addition, the repeated emphasis in this paragraph of the decision on what the accused saw and knew
– on what was apparent to the accused – suggests that Justice Duncan may have conflated the actus reus
for the offence of sexual assault with the mens rea for this offence. In analyzing the actus reus, “the focus
is placed squarely on the complainant’s state of mind, and the accused’s perception of that state of mind
is irrelevant.”54 It is not that evidence of the accused’s observations of the complainant’s conduct or (lack
of) communication is irrelevant to the trier of fact’s assessment of her state of mind at the time of the
incident. Such evidence is relevant.55 Rather, it is that Justice Duncan’s repeated emphasis on the
accused’s perceptions – particularly, his explanation as to why the accused may not have been aware of
her resistance – suggests that his conclusion regarding the actus reus may have been informed by an
assessment of the accused’s state of mind at the time of the incident. This would be an error of law.
Justice Duncan also pointed to the complainant’s failure to provide the accused with “verbal cues”
indicating her lack of consent to being choked with his penis.56 This aspect of the decision also suggests
49
50
51
52
53

54
55

56

Hunter, supra note 22 at para 161.
Ibid at para 156.
Ibid at para 157.
Ibid.
See R v M (ML), [1994] 2 SCR 3 [M (ML)]: “The majority of the Court of Appeal was in error in holding that a victim is
required to offer some minimal word or gesture of objection and that lack of resistance must be equated with consent.” See
also R v ARJD, [2017] AJ No 746, aff’d [2018] 1 SCR 218 [ARJD]. In ARJD, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed a
decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal to overturn an acquittal because the trial judge relied on an impermissible
stereotype (at para 2): “[H]e judged the complainant’s credibility based solely on the correspondence between her
behaviour and the expected behaviour of the stereotypical victim of sexual assault. This constituted an error of law.” See
generally Susan Estrich, Real Rape (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1987).
R v Barton, [2019] SCJ No 33 at para 89 [Barton]. See also R v Ewanchuk, [1999] SCJ No 10 at para 26 [Ewanchuk].
Ewanchuk, supra note 54 at para 29 (“[w]hile the complainant’s testimony is the only source of direct evidence as to her
state of mind, credibility must still be assessed by the trial judge, or jury, in light of all the evidence. It is open to the
accused to claim that the complainant’s words and actions, before and during the incident, raise a reasonable doubt
against her assertion that she, in her mind, did not want the sexual touching to take place”). See also Lisa Dufraimont,
“Myth, Inference and Evidence in Sexual Assault Trials” (2019) 44:2 Queen’s LJ 316.
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 42 (in reference to the first instances of oral penetration – which she characterized as
consensual – before she took the position on the bed), para 43 (in reference to the oral penetration while she was laying
on the bed – which she testified were non-consensual).
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a possible conflation of the actus reus and the mens rea. A complainant’s lack of verbal cues indicating
non-consent following consensual S/M sexual acts might be probative of the mens rea for sexual assault,
depending on the facts. Recall, however, that the actus reus for the offence of sexual assault is determined
based on the complainant’s state of mind at the time of the incident.57 In the face of evidence from both
the complainant and the accused that she was gagging, coughing, and, at times, could not breathe because
the accused was shoving his penis down her throat, a lack of verbal cues indicating non-consent is not
particularly probative of her state of mind at the time of the incident. She testified that she was unable to
speak while she was trying to push him away because “his penis was all the way down [her] throat, as
well his stomach was blocking over [her] nose area”.58 Moreover, her evidence was that she was crying –
which is a form of verbal cue.
The trial judge’s second basis for concluding that the Crown failed to prove that the complainant did
not voluntarily agree to be choked with the accused’s penis was as follows: when the accused did become
aware that the complainant was “uncomfortable with the deep throat experience,” he promised not to push
his penis in as far and he kept his promise.59 The complainant’s evidence was that all of the incidents of
choking her with his penis while in this position on the bed – both the incidents before and after he “kept
his promise” – were non-consensual.60 She testified that when the accused pushed his penis into the back
of her throat while she was in that position on the bed she felt like she could not breathe. She panicked,
began crying, and tried to push him away.61 Whether the accused promised not to choke the complainant
with his penis again, and then kept his promise, is not probative of whether she voluntarily agreed to him
repeatedly choking her by pushing his penis that far down her throat in the first place.62 Nor is the fact
that he kept his promise probative of her state of mind, either before or after the promise was issued.
The complainant testified that, after his promise not to push his penis as far down her throat, she
allowed the accused to penetrate her throat one further time out of a fear generated in part because he
slapped her. In articulating the basis for finding there was a reasonable doubt that A.G. was not consenting
to the last “act[] of fellatio,” Justice Duncan pointed to the lack of physical evidence that she had been
slapped across the face; the lack of evidence that she was otherwise threatened by the accused; and the
fact that further sexual acts were negotiated and occurred after he stopped choking her with his penis.63
To be clear, the trial judge may have relied on his rejection of her evidence that she had been slapped
simply to assess her credibility, which would be acceptable. It would be a legal error, however, to conclude
that a lack of physical violence itself raised a reasonable doubt about the allegedly non-consensual nature
57
58
59
60

61

62
63

Barton, supra note 54 at para 89; Ewanchuk, supra note 54 at para 26.
Testimony of Complainant, supra note 33 at 11h:34m:00s, 12h:15:12s
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 158.
Testimony of Complainant, supra note 33 at 11h:34m:01s – 11h:37m:00s: “Umm ... and then as a response Logan said
he won’t go as far down this time and just for me to do it one more time. Umm ... I did give in and agree because by that
point I was feeling scared and like he wasn’t going to listen to anything I had to say.”
See ibid at 11h:33m:31s – 11h:35m:00s. See also Hunter, supra note 22 at para 43 (“[i]n relation to the next two
instances of fellatio, she said that he asked her to lie on the bed and she did so. She testified that Mr. Hunter went further
than she wanted to on the first occasion, but she did not tell him that. In cross-examination she agreed that she
‘permitted’ him to do this.” That she did not tell him that she did not want him to insert his penis so far down her throat
does not mean it was consensual.
Barton, supra note 54; JA, supra note 10; Ewanchuk, supra note 54.
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 161.
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of the oral penetration.64 In terms of the lack of evidence that the accused threatened her, recall that the
complainant was in a position on the bed such that the accused had “complete control”65 over how far he
pushed his penis down her throat. She was in an unknown trailer, in a remote and unfamiliar rural area,
late at night, without her own transportation. She was outnumbered by two individuals, well known to
each other but unfamiliar to her. It seems highly unlikely that threats of further violence would have been
necessary to facilitate the accused’s acts under these circumstances. Nor does it seem reasonable, in these
circumstances, to reject a complainant’s evidence that she was afraid on the basis of a lack of evidence
that the accused had made threats.
It is also problematic to rely on subsequent sexual acts, or their alleged negotiation of subsequent sexual
acts, as evidence that the complainant voluntarily agreed, in her own mind, to being choked with the
accused’s penis while in this position on the bed. This is true even though the Court rejected her claim
during her examination in chief that the subsequent sexual acts were also non-consensual.
Following the incidents of choking the complainant with his penis, and other sexual acts involving the
three parties, the accused penetrated her vaginally with his penis. She testified that, while this was
occurring, he “grabbed my, my breast … and then he was squeezing it incredibly hard, [to] the point where
it was painful, and I told him “ow” but he continued having sex with me.”66 The Crown introduced
photographs the complainant took after the incident which showed some bruising on her breast. The
complainant testified that the accused “then put his hand over my neck, while having sex with me … and
at that point I panicked again and I didn’t want it to continue anymore.”67 Her evidence was that she tried
to remove his hand from her throat and said stop but that he continued penetrating her, keeping his hand
around her throat, until he ejaculated shortly after that.68
Justice Duncan concluded that the Crown had failed to prove that the complainant “did not consent to
the fondling and pinch of her breasts.”69 The basis for this conclusion was that “pinching” of the breasts
is within the scope of BDSM activities; the complainant did not protest to the conduct; and the accused
saw no indication that the complainant was either not consenting or wanting to withdraw consent to this

64
65

66
67
68

69

M (ML), supra note 53; Ewanchuk, supra note 54.
Defence counsel’s cross-examination of the complainant certainly seemed to be aimed at raising the prospect that the
accused had an honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent rather than a focus on challenging her evidence that
the incidents of oral penetration while she was on the bed in this position were consensual. See e.g. Hunter, supra note
22 at paras 46, 54 (“I’m gonna suggest to you as well Ms. G. that a lot of your lack of consent was happening in your
head, but not necessarily being expressed to Mr. Hunter and the female party. Would you agree with that?”); see also
para 126 (in which the trial judge’s summary of the defence position is also consistent with this assertion regarding
defence counsel’s seeming theory of the case).
Ibid at para 16.
Testimony of Complainant, supra note 33 at 11h:39m:14s.
Ibid at 15h:44m:23s – 15h:45m:07s. The evidence of the length of time between when the complainant told him to stop
and when he ejaculated and then removed his penis was inconsistent. The complainant initially indicated that it was one
to two minutes but later agreed that the period of time was short. S.D. told the police that there was a delay between A.G.
telling him to stop and the accused actually stopping. Testimony of S.D., supra note 36 at 10h:09m:05s – 10h:10m:53s;
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 76. At trial, she testified that it was a matter of seconds, agreeing on cross-examination that
it was approximately ten seconds. Hunter, ibid, at para 77. The trial judge rejected the Crown’s suggestion that Hunter
ignored the complainant’s direction to him to stop, instead ceasing only after he had ejaculated.
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 175.
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type of conduct.70 This reasoning includes errors similar to those he made with respect to the allegations
that Hunter non-consensually choked the complainant with his penis.
First, it was inaccurate to assert that the complainant did not protest. She testified that she said “ow.”71
Expressing “ow” in response to the application of force is a form of protest and evidence of her state of
mind at the time the squeezing of her breast occurred.
Second, as occurred in his analysis of the incidents in which the accused pushed his penis down her
throat, the trial judge’s focus on what the accused perceived suggests he may not have properly
distinguished between the actus reus and the mens rea of the offence.
Third, whether breast pinching (which is not the term the complainant used to describe the incident) is
within the scope of BDSM activities is not probative of the complainant’s state of mind at the time her
breast was, according to her, squeezed “incredibly hard” by the accused. Consent must be determined in
relation to specific sexual acts, not a scope of activities. As stated by Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin
in R v J.A., “the definition of consent for sexual assault requires the complainant to provide actual active
consent throughout every phase of the sexual activity.”72 There was no evidence that the complainant
understood the wrenching of her breast to be part of the, as she described it, “dominance submissive kind
of relationship”73 she thought was to occur.74 Without such evidence, the conclusion that breast wrenching
is within “the range of acceptable actions within the BDSM culture” is irrelevant to the complainant’s
state of mind at the time that it occurred.
To be clear, the trial judge’s written reasons reflect an articulation of the law that was, with one
important exception,75 accurate.76 The errors in applying this legal doctrine outlined in the preceding
paragraphs might be explained by the judicial approach taken to the assessment of these acts in light of
the S/M context in which they are said to have occurred. To facilitate the ability of women to pursue
sexual desires that extend beyond, or subvert, norms of monogamy, reproductive sex, and romantic ideals,
without forfeiting their legal protections under the criminal law, it is critical that the feminist-informed
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Ibid at para 175. Part IV examines this particular aspect of the reasoning in Hunter. There was no evidence, expert or
otherwise, that “breast pinching” was “within the scope of BDSM activities.” Duncan J appears to have taken judicial
notice of this “fact.” More significantly, there was no evidence from either the complainant or the accused that the
complainant had agreed to breast pinching. One of the problems in this case is that, in questioning the complainant and
the accused, both the Crown and defence counsel tended to ask questions about their understanding of BDSM generally
rather than questions about what specifically they had contemplated and understood themselves to be consenting to at the
time.
Testimony of Complainant, supra note 33 at 11h:39m:07s – 11h:39m:11s. A.G. stated in her testimony: “I told him “ow”
but he continued having sex with me.”
JA, supra note 10 at para 66.
Testimony of Complainant, supra note 33 at 11h:22m.
The complainant was asked: “what does BDSM mean?” She responded: “a style of consensual sexual activity that
usually involves either um so like bondage or submissives or things like that um it usually involves … it can be a bit
more rougher but its usually all communicated beforehand.” Ibid at 2h:18m. Duncan J found that the parties had not
communicated about which sexual acts they would engage in as part of the “threesome.”
See e.g. Hunter, supra note 22 at paras 129–133. As discussed in the next part, he did misstate the law with respect to the
issue of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.
See e.g. ibid at paras 110–125.
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legal doctrine of consent developed in the past several decades in Canada be applied properly.77 The
doctrine does not differ based on the nature of the sexual activity. The legal test for consent is the same
regardless of the context in which the allegations arise.
To summarize, the Court in Hunter concluded that the Crown failed to prove that the complainant did
not want to be choked with the accused’s penis, have her breast grabbed hard, or be vaginally penetrated
while, and after, the accused was causing pain to her breast or partially strangling her. Justice Duncan did
conclude that the complainant did not consent to having the accused’s hand around her throat while he
was penetrating her vagina. This raised the issue of mens rea – whether the accused had an honest but
mistaken belief that the complainant communicated consent to having his hand around her throat while he
penetrated her vagina with his penis. Justice Duncan found that he did.
IV. MENS REA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE “ROUGH SEX DEFENCE”
The legal errors in this part of the Hunter decision were also significant. They can be grouped into three
categories. First, Justice Duncan misstated the legal standard for the honest but mistaken belief in
communicated consent defence and relied on the notion of implied consent.78 Second, his finding that
there was an air of reality to the defence was premised on evidence of broad, advance consent to sexual
activity of an undefined scope. Third, Justice Duncan failed to properly analyze whether the accused took
reasonable steps in the circumstances known to him to ascertain consent.
A. Consent to “Rough Sex” Must Be Communicated Not Implied
The trial judge’s articulation of the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent
failed to adequately capture its affirmative and communicative elements. In describing the legal principles
governing the mens rea for sexual assault, Justice Duncan stated that “[i]f I have a reasonable doubt about
whether Mr. Hunter honestly believed that A.G. consented to the sexual activity with which he is charged,
then I must find Mr. Hunter not guilty.”79 He referred to the defence as the “mistaken belief in apprehended
consent.”80 He stated that “[t]he accused must honestly believe that the complainant voluntarily agreed to
participate in the sexual activity which she says she did not consent to.”81
77
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79
80
81

See e.g. Ewanchuk, supra note 54 at paras 26, 45 (in which the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the
definition of consent articulated by Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé in R v Park, [1995] 2 SCR 386. L’Heureux-Dubé J
was widely known to be a feminist (see Constance Backhouse, Claire L’Heureux-Dubé: A Life (Vancouver: UBC Press,
2017) and regularly relied on the work of feminist academics in her decisions (see e.g. Ewanchuk, supra note 54 at paras
68, 82).
While commonly referred to as a defence, the burden remains on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused did not honestly believe the complainant had communicated consent.
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 129.
This is the subheading used between paragraphs 128 and 129 of the decision. Ibid.
Ibid at para 131. He made the same mistake at paragraph 132. He also stated that “there can be no honest belief if Mr
Hunter was aware that he needed to find out whether A.G. would agree to participate in this activity but did nothing
about it because he did not want to know the truth” (at para 31; emphasis added). This is also a problematic way to
describe the legal standard. Mr. Hunter did need to find out whether A.G. was agreeing to participate, whether he was
aware of this legal obligation is not part of the standard. A lack of awareness of this requirement on the part of the
accused would be a mistake of law, not a mistake of fact.
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In fact, as the Supreme Court of Canada established in R. v Ewanchuk in 1999 and reiterated in R. v
Barton a few months before the Hunter decision was released, “in order to make out the … defence, the
accused must have an honest but mistaken belief that the complainant actually communicated consent,
whether by words or conduct.”82 The focus on communication is sufficiently critical such that the Court
in Barton directed courts to refer to the defence as “an honest but mistaken belief in communicated
consent.”83 Far from trifling semantics, the Supreme Court’s direction was intended to “focus all justice
system participants on the crucial question of communication of consent and avoid inadvertently straying
into the forbidden territory of assumed or implied consent.”84
Unfortunately, the territory of assumed or implied consent is precisely where the reasoning in Hunter
landed. The trial judge stated:
It was the first and only time that a choking action was attempted. It was an escalation of
what was seen by Mr. Hunter as within the range of permissible BDSM conduct. I accept
that it could be within the range of such conduct as the infliction of pain or other forms of
discomfort are implied by the BDSM construct.”85
The Supreme Court of Canada’s point, in the long-standing line of cases from Ewanchuk to Barton, is that
the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent does not turn on what was seen by an
accused to be within the range of permissible sexual conduct or on what a judge considers to be implied
by a particular sexual “construct.” It is the accused’s perception of what the complainant communicated
that drives the analysis. As the Court highlighted in Barton, “the principal considerations that are relevant
to this defence are (1) the complainant’s actual communicative behaviour and (2) the totality of the
admissible and relevant evidence explaining how the accused perceived that behaviour to communicate
consent.”86 The accused must point to some evidence to support his belief that the complainant
contemporaneously communicated a willingness to engage in the specific sexual act at issue. As Justice
Andromache Karakastanis stated in R. v Goldfinch, “contemporaneous, affirmatively communicated
consent must be given for each and every sexual act.”87 This requirement is the same whether the parties
are engaged in vanilla, S/M, or any other type of sexual activity.
The accused in Hunter was permitted to rely on implied consent as a defence to strangling the
complainant while penetrating her vaginally. Asphyxiation, or what is sometimes referred to as “breath
82
83
84
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Barton, supra note 54 at para 91(emphasis in original).
Ibid at para 91.
Ibid at para 92.
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 176 [emphasis added]. Of note, it was not the first time a choking action was attempted.
The accused repeatedly choked the complainant with his penis prior to placing his hand around her throat. Moreover, the
appropriate word to use to describe this latter aspect of the allegation is strangulation or partial strangulation, not
choking. While pushing his penis that far down her throat does involve choking, partially constricting her breathing by
placing his hand around her throat is an act of strangulation, not choking. See Busby, supra note 4 at 338 (discussing the
distinction between strangulation (which involves applying external pressure to the trachea to impede blood and oxygen
flow to the brain and is more dangerous) and choking (which involves an obstruction inside the throat caused by a
foreign object or substance)).
Barton, supra note 54 at para 91 (quoting L’Heureux-Dubé J’s decision in R v Park, supra note 77 at para 44).
2019 SCC 38 at para 44 [Goldfinch].
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play” in S/M circles, is considered one of the most extreme S/M activities because of its inherent and
unpredictable risks.88 Experts recommend that individuals exercise “extreme caution” before engaging in
“breath play,” including safety training, ensuring all participants are sober, and carefully negotiated and
established consent.89 They also recommend that it never be done by placing external pressure on
someone’s airway, which is what the accused did in Hunter.90 As Busby explains, unlike loss of oxygen
from choking or suffocation (which involves an obstruction to the mouth and nose or the inside of the
throat caused by a foreign object or substance and which takes longer to become life threatening),
impeding blood and, thus, oxygen flow to the brain by applying external pressure to the trachea can cause
cardiac arrest or brain damage within seconds.91 According to Shef, “[a]ny neck compression can not only
deter breath, but also inhibit blood circulation to the brain. Blood vessels that have collapsed under
pressure can be slow to begin circulating blood again, even after the pressure is released.”92 Not only was
it a legal error to permit the accused to imply consent to this dangerous and unpredictable act, even if
consent to sexual acts could be legally “implied by [consent to] the BDSM construct,” Justice Duncan’s
empirical conclusion regarding what falls within “the permissible range of BDSM conduct” was not well
founded.93 This same type of lack of awareness or knowledge on the part of judges was highlighted in
Busby’s review of Canadian case law more broadly.94 Trial judges ought not take judicial notice of what
falls within the range of a particular sexual dynamic or context.
Hunter testified that he finds it very arousing to strangle someone in this manner but that he does not
do it for more than thirty seconds because he thinks that that is about how long someone can hold their
breath.95 Again, any neck compression, even for a very brief period of time, can cause serious injury or
death.96 To permit accused individuals to rely on the notion that a woman implied consent to being
strangled by agreeing in advance to a “dominance-submissive type relationship” is to profoundly
undervalue not only the sexual integrity, but also the physical safety, of women. It is also a legal error.97
This particular legal error highlights the inextricable relationship, discussed in the introduction,
between promoting the ability of women to explore and pursue sexual desire and protecting their sexual
integrity through law. The boundary between preserving personal autonomy and protecting human health
and safety through criminal laws remains contested. Currently, a complainant’s consent to sexual activity
will be vitiated under Canadian law if the accused caused, and intended to cause, serious bodily harm.98
There remains resistance, even among some feminists, to the assertion that sexual activities that cause
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See Busby, supra note 4 at 11, citing Lisa Downing, “Beyond Safety: Erotic Asphyxiation and the Limits of SM
Discourse” in Barker Darren Langdridge & Meg Barker, eds, Safe, Sane and Consensual: Contemporary Perspectives on
Sadomasochism (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2008) 119 at 122–123.
Shef, supra note 4 at 6.
Ibid; Busby, supra note 4.
See Busby, supra note 4 at 11.
Shef, supra note 4 at 7.
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 176.
Busby, supra note 4.
Testimony of Accused, supra note 31 at 2h:34m.
Shef, supra note 4 at 7.
JA, supra note 10.
See Jobidon, supra note 17; Paice, supra note 17; Quashie, supra note 17.
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serious bodily harm ought to be legally prohibited even if engaged in with consent.99 The suggestion that
consent to an act that can cause brain damage and death ought not to be vitiated on policy grounds in an
effort to protect sexual autonomy must be assessed in light of a legal context in which judges are still
willing to imply consent to acts like strangulation.100 This aspect of the reasoning in Hunter throws this
legal context into relief.
More generally, the standard of contemporaneous, affirmative communication and corresponding
rejection of the notion of implied consent are of particular importance in the context of S/M. Without this
standard, there is a significant risk that problematic social assumptions, or stereotypical thinking, will
infiltrate judicial analysis in cases involving women who consented to some form of sexual activity outside
the parameters of monogamous heteronormativity, such that men will be permitted to assume that they
were consenting to other, or any, sexual activity. In addition to endangering the physical safety of women,
reliance on implied consent to adjudicate the “rough sex defence” is highly likely to produce legal
reasoning that is infected with problematic social assumptions about sex, gender, race, and rape.
Take, for example, the relationship between racism and the well-documented historical “whiteness of
BDSM” in both practice and academic writing.101 Katherine Martinez highlights a wealth of research
demonstrating the way in which BDSM practice and research has traditionally centred the experiences of
white people.102 Martinez suggests that more recent research and practices have challenged the “whiteness
of BDSM” but that processes of racialization continue to maintain white privilege in BDSM spaces.103
Similarly, Arian Cruz argues that, while “the controversial praxis of race play” permits black women to
subvert the “racial and sexual otherness that characterizes the lived experience of Black womanhood,” it
also introduces racial scripts and racism into these simulated acts of dominance and submission.104 Cruz
explains “race play” as “a BDSM practice that explicitly uses race to script power exchange and the
dynamics of domination and submission. Most commonly an interracial erotic play, race play employs
racism, often involving the exchange of racist language, role-playing, and the construction of racist
scenes.”105
Judicial reasoning that implies consent to violent sexual acts on the basis of a complainant’s purported
agreement to participate in a “race play” BDSM construct would be highly susceptible to infection by
discriminatory thinking about the human worth of racialized and Indigenous women and racist stereotypes

99
100
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See e.g. Khan, “Hot for Kink,” supra note 11.
Busby, supra note 4.
See Katherine Martinez, “Overwhelming Whiteness of BDSM: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Racialization in
BDSM” (2020) 24:5-6 Sexualities 733 at 734.
Ibid.
Ibid
Ariane Cruz, “Beyond Black and Blue: BDSM, Internet Pornography, and Black Female Sexuality” (2015) 41:2 Feminist
Studies 409 at 410.
Cruz argues that “[m]utually consensual pleasure in the moment, regardless of whether such rapture is linked to the
internalization and/or perpetuation – conscious, unconscious, or subconscious – of oppressive white heteropatriarchal
supremacist structures and values (past, present, and future), is what matters.” Ibid at 413. Even if that is what matters,
we have to produce a jurisprudence that can properly identify whether a particular act is mutually consensual pleasure.
Using a consent to a sexual construct framework risks reliance on the stereotypes and social assumptions that underpin
those supremacist structures and values to make this assessment and clearly will not achieve this objective.
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about their sexual availability and hyper sexuality.106 It would be almost certain to reify law’s already too
frequent and deeply unjust failure to render legible the sexual violation of women legally and socially
marginalized on the basis of race and Indigeneity.107
B. Consent to “Rough Sex” Must Be Affirmative Not Negative
A related, equally important, and well-established aspect of the legal standard for this defence is its
construction of consent as affirmative: “[F]or purposes of the defence of honest but mistaken belief in
communicated consent, ‘consent’ means that the complainant had affirmatively communicated by words
or conduct her agreement to engage in [the] sexual activity with the accused.”108 In Goldfinch, the Supreme
Court of Canada commented: “Today, not only does no mean no, but only yes means yes. Nothing less
than positive affirmation is required.”109 Contrast this standard with the summary of the position of the
defence offered by the trial judge in Hunter:
The accused advances a variety of responses to the allegations made against him:
•
•
•
•

[h]e says that he did not hear the complainant say “no” or otherwise communicate to
him that she was not consenting to the last act of fellatio that she performed upon
him;110
[h]e denies slapping her in the face;
[h]e acknowledges squeezing her breasts during intercourse, but he was not aware that
the complainant was not consenting to these acts;
[h]e admits that he put his hand on the complainant’s throat during intercourse but that
it was not intended to enable an act of sexual assault.111

Even if accepted, not one of these assertions gives rise to an air of reality to the defence of honest but
mistaken belief in communicated consent. Again, the legal test for honest but mistaken belief in
communicated consent is affirmative communication. Relying on a complainant’s failure to resist, or a
lack of threat and physical coercion on the part of the accused, to establish or support a belief in consent
is a mistake of law.
For purposes of analyzing the mens rea, the issue in Hunter was not whether the accused heard the
complainant say “no” or otherwise communicate that she was not consenting. The issue is whether he
heard or observed words or actions on the part of the complainant that would support a belief that she
106

107
108
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110
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See e.g. Sherene Razack, “Gendering Disposability” (2016) 28 CJWL 285; Akeia Benard, “Colonizing Black Female
Bodies within Patriarchal Capitalism: Feminist and Human Rights Perspectives” (2016) 2:4 Sexualization, Media &
Society 1.
Barton, supra note 54 at para 162.
Ibid at para 90, citing Ewanchuk, supra note 54 at para 49.
Goldfinch, supra note 87 at para 44. See also Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 273.2(c).
One point that appears to be blurred in this decision is that the complainant’s evidence was that she did not consent to
any of the repeated acts of fellatio that occurred while her head was hung over the side of the bed. Her evidence was that
she consented to the earlier acts of oral penetration, before she was in this position on the bed. See Hunter, supra note 22
at para 16.
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 126.
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communicated her consent to being partially strangled while he was penetrating her with his penis. There
was nothing in the evidentiary record to support a belief that the complainant had communicated her
willingness to have him place his hand around her throat, partially constricting her airway, while he was
penetrating her vagina.
In S/M, as Cheryl Hanna describes it, “sex and violence intersect.”112 As with the communicative
element of the mens rea for sexual assault, this “intersection” makes the affirmative aspect of the legal
standard for consent particularly important in the context of S/M. The reasoning in Hunter failed to apply
this important aspect of the doctrine of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.
C. Consent, Whether Part of a S/M Scene or Not, Must Be Specific and Contemporaneous, Not
Broad and in Advance
Evidence of broad, advance consent cannot be relied upon as the basis for an honest but mistaken belief
in communicated consent, regardless of whether the parties contemplated S/M.
In Hunter, Justice Duncan concluded that
Mr. Hunter honestly and reasonably believed that his conduct in putting his hand on A.G.’s
throat, in the way he did, was within the bounds of permissible conduct contemplated by
the mutual agreement that the activities that night were to be governed by the BDSM
parameters of conduct. This was a defined context for the activities that night.113
In providing an “overview of [the accused’s beliefs],” he stated:
It is important to remember how this began. It was a plan that had been discussed
previously and one that A.G. appeared to be interested in pursuing. She knew and agreed
to participate in a BDSM governed sexual experience with two persons, in a place she had
never been and with one person she had never met. She showed considerable determination
to make her way to Cow Bay to participate.114
There are two problems with this reasoning. First, this is not an accurate representation of what transpired
based on the evidence introduced at trial. In fact, a plan had not been previously discussed and agreed to
by the three parties involved. A.G. and S.D. had never met, or spoken, let alone discussed a plan for the
sexual activities.115 At trial, S.D. did not appear even to know the complainant’s name.116 There was no
evidence that A.G. and the accused had discussed what was to occur, beyond the broad stroke suggestion
of a threesome that would involve, in the complainant’s words, a “dominance-submissive type

112
113
114
115
116

Hanna, supra note 1 at 239.
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 179.
Ibid at para 181.
Ibid.
Testimony of S.D., supra note 36.
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relationship.”117 Indeed, Duncan J noted that there was “no evidence that the parties had such a discussion
and so the parameters of what might be permitted was left unstated.”118
The lack of a common understanding of this supposed “BDSM governed sexual experience,” as Justice
Duncan described it, was starkly evidenced by the fact that the complainant and Hunter and S.D. did not
share a view regarding even the most basic elements of the “scene.”119 For example, the complainant
testified that she was the submissive and that S.D. and the accused were the dominants.120 S.D. testified
that she and the complainant were both submissives and that Hunter was the dominant, which appears to
have also been the accused’s understanding.121
Similarly, while there was a text message between Hunter and the complainant (subsequent to the
incident) in which he reminds her that he had told her she was “going to learn to take it deep,”122 there
was no evidence to suggest that the complainant and the accused discussed him repeatedly choking her
with his penis while she lay in that position on the bed. Nor was there any evidence of a discussion about
him inflicting pain upon her by grabbing her breast, or any evidence of a shared plan for him to place his
hand around her throat while penetrating her vagina with his penis. Nor was there any evidence that they
had discussed how consent was to be communicated with respect to each of these acts. Again, the trial
judge specifically found that the complainant, S.D., and Hunter had not discussed and agreed to the sexual
acts that took place.123 As Cara Dunkley and Lori Brotto note, “explicitly negotiated consent is “the single
universal characteristic in BDSM sexual interactions and is considered a fundamental tenet in the BDSM
community.”124
Throughout the trial, there were references by the complainant, the accused, and legal counsel to other
sexual activity between the complainant and the accused.125 There was no section 276 application in this
case.126 The complainant and the accused sent digital communications to each other both before and after
the incident. If the evidence of other sexual activity, alluded to at trial, involved sexual communications
stipulating specifically what was to occur and how consent to each agreed upon sexual act was to be
contemporaneously communicated it should have been introduced. Either the Crown ought to have sought
a voir dire or the accused ought to have brought a section 276 application pursuant to section 278.93 of
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Testimony of Complainant, supra note 33 at 11h:22m:24s. When asked by the Crown what the purpose of the meeting
was, A.G. responded: “The purpose was for a um like a threesome almost, so in a- so it was um, like a dominantsubmissive kind of relationship.”
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 150.
Ibid at para 181.
See Testimony of Complainant, supra note 33 at 14h:23m:12s – 14h:23m:46s.
See Hunter, supra note 22 at para 88.
Ibid at para 29.
Ibid at para 173.
Dunkley & Brotto, supra note 2 at 17.
R v Hunter, Audio Trial Transcript, 25–26 September 2019, Halifax CRH481783 (NSSC). Unfortunately, at one point,
the Crown objected to a question posed during the cross-examination of the complainant on the basis that it was
“straying very close to the prior meetings between these two which were I believe all of a sexual nature.” The trial judge
pointed out that he would not have known that if the Crown had not just revealed it to him. Ibid at 2h:24m:14s.
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 104.
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the Criminal Code so that the Court could determine whether, and the purpose for which, it could be
admitted.127
Perhaps more important than the manner in which Justice Duncan characterized their prior “plan,”128
the second problem with this aspect of the reasoning in Hunter is that it relies on broad, advance consent
as the basis for the defence. Relying on a complainant’s agreement in advance to participate in a so-called
“BDSM governed sexual experience”129 to establish an air of reality to the honest but mistaken belief in
communicated consent defence is an error of law.130 From a criminal law perspective, sexual interactions
127

As an aside, improper admission of evidence of a complainant’s other sexual activity has been particularly
problematic in cases in which an accused defends himself on the basis of the “rough sex” defence. It serves as
another example of the way in which this “rough sex defence” can be dangerous for women. See e.g. TJN, supra
note 10; DAB, supra note 10; Marsden, supra note 10; JA, supra note 10. See also Busby, supra note 4 at 332. An
especially disturbing example of this is MS, supra note 25. In MS, McKay J allowed the defence to introduce
numerous, sexually graphic text messages between the accused and complainant. While some may have been
properly admitted, many of them were highly prejudicial to the complainant and irrelevant to the basis upon which
McKay J granted defence counsel’s section 276 application. He then went on to rely on some of these irrelevant
and prejudicial texts in his decision to acquit. To provide one example, at para 39 of his decision:
A series of text messages dated September 5, 2006 included the following conversation:
Ms. L: Did I ever tell you about that dude I fucked in the bathroom in Thailand
Mr. S: I don't think so, tell me.
Ms. L: I went to a bar and met this Russian guy and he was really aggressive. And so he pulled me into
the bathroom and I was sucking his dick, and he started aggressively skull fucking me and I smashed
my head off the wall and blacked out for a second and that's the story of how I got a concussion from
giving a blow job
Mr. S: hahaha god damnnn.
Ms. L: Yeah he was great
Mr. S: it was probably nice finding white men there eh, they probably were not in high stock in
Thailand ahah
Ms. L: Meh, doesn't really matter to me
Mr. S: hahaha anybody will do
Mr. S: haha literally do hah
Mr. S: anybody roughly the least haha
Ms. L: Hahah

The complainant testified that this was a fictional story she shared with the accused. These communications were admitted as
relevant to honest but mistaken belief in (communicated) consent (at para 13). Given that the story had nothing to do with
interactions between the complainant and the accused, it is difficult to understand why it was admitted on this basis. In
discussing these text messages, McKay J noted that the complainant had “agreed that the message exchange was part of her
wanting Mr. M.S to know or at least believe that sort of violent, aggressive fictional episode was something that she enjoyed.
She agreed that she wanted Mr. M.S to believe that she enjoyed rough and even slightly violent sex.” It would be
impermissible to conclude that her supposed propensity for violent sex made it more likely she consented to sex with the
accused. It would be an error of law to rely on these communications as part of the basis for acquitting an accused based on a
reasonable doubt regarding his honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.
128
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 181.
129
Ibid at para 181.
130
Barton, supra note 54 at para 91.
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in Canada are “governed” by the law of consent not the “BDSM construct.”131 One cannot contract out of
the law of sexual assault in Canada.132 That is to say, one consents to sexual acts, not sexual constructs.
The Crown should have appealed this case on the basis of that aspect of the decision alone.
As is true of any sexual activity, and as Cheryl Hanna observed, “[i]ndividuals who initially consent to
S/M encounters … can change their minds, unaware of what exactly it is that they are getting into.”133 If,
at the moment the contact occurred, the complainant was unwilling or not desirous of the particular act –
whether that is because she changed her mind for any reason or because what occurred is different than
what she anticipated due to miscommunication or misunderstanding, or because the accused used more
force than she wanted, or for any other reason – then the contact is non-consensual.134 If the accused
cannot point to some evidence as the basis for a belief that the complainant was communicating consent
at the time the act occurred, and that he took reasonable steps in the circumstances known to him at the
time to ascertain this, then he is guilty of sexual assault.135 Whatever a complainant might have agreed to
in advance is not determinative. Advance consent has no legal effect.136 Relying on it is an error of law.137
A proximate, highly detailed discussion that involved specifics regarding how communication of
consent for each specific sexual act would occur, including whether that communication would be verbal
or physical, may be relied upon as evidence of an accused’s honest but mistaken belief in communicated
consent.138 But “[a] belief that the complainant gave broad advance consent to sexual activity of an
undefined scope will afford the accused no defence, as that belief is premised on a mistake of law, not
fact.”139
The reasoning of the trial judge in R. v A.E. contained the same type of error regarding advance consent
to rough sex as occurred in Hunter.140 A.E. involved a horrific sexual assault of a young woman by three
men. One of them pled guilty to sexual assault. His sentencing judge described the incident, which was
videotaped, as “the most appalling acts of human depravity I have had the displeasure to witness as a
judge.”141 The other two accused stood trial and were acquitted of most of the charges. The trial judge
found that there was a reasonable doubt as to the complainant’s consent to most of the acts, in part because
of evidence that the incident was initially consensual and that she had asked for rough sex.142 The Crown
appealed the acquittals.
In substituting a conviction for the trial judge’s decision to acquit two of the men in that case, Justice
Peter Martin of the Alberta Court of Appeal stated: “With respect, the trial judge erred in law by assuming
131
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Hunter, supra note 22 at para 176.
Tellingly, the decision in Hunter included the following excerpt from the testimony of SD: “Q. Can BDSM include no
consent? A. Well it ca- ca- it can include no consent, providing that there is a safe word or something established prior to
the situation” (ibid at para 80). It was odd for counsel to ask in a sexual assault trial whether BDSM can include no
consent. See Hanna, supra note 1 (noting that sadomasochism is, by definition, consensual activity).
Hanna, supra note 1 at 275.
JA, supra note 10 at para 66.
See Barton, supra note 54; Ewanchuk, supra note 54.
Criminal Code, supra note 109, s 273.1(1.1)
See JA, supra note 10.
See Barton, supra note 54 at para 93.
Barton, supra note 54 at para 99, citing JA, supra note 10.
AE, supra note 25.
R v MM, 2017 ABPC 268 at para 59 (CanLII) (sentencing decision).
AE, supra note 25.
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that since the complainant had initiated the sex and asked that it be rough, she was consenting to all that
followed. His apparent reliance on broad advance consent was misplaced. He failed to consider whether
the complainant consented to all that occurred at the time it occurred.”143
In Hunter, Justice Duncan relied on a broad, general agreement between two of the three parties, made
in advance, to engage in a threesome involving “sexual practices associated with BDSM.”144 Again, there
was no evidence that this general agreement included details regarding each specific act or what
communication was to occur during the activity with respect to each specific act. Relying on the
complainant’s willingness to take the bus to Cow Bay, or her advance consent to participate in a threesome
to be “governed by a dominance-submissive relationship,” as the basis for an honest belief that she had
communicated consent to have her breathing partially constricted by placing his hand around her throat
while she was being vaginally penetrated by the accused was a mistake of law on the part of the accused,
not a mistake of fact.145 Nor would this unspecified, general advance agreement to engage in a threesome
with a dominance theme provide the basis for an honest but mistaken belief that the complainant
communicated consent to being repeatedly choked with his penis or to having her breast squeezed
“incredibly hard.”146 Had the trial judge found that these acts were non-consensual, the defence would not
properly have been available for them on this basis either.147
The obiter offered in R. v M.S., on the issue of mistaken belief in communicated consent, is similar to
this error in Hunter.148 In M.S., the complainant (who was younger than the accused and had met him
when she was a thirteen-year-old child) alleged that the accused sexually assaulted her twice when she
was seventeen. She alleged that on the first occasion he, against her resistance, kissed her, pushed her
against a wall, put his hand around her throat, and bit her. Four days later, according to the complainant,
he kissed her, bit her lips and neck, ripped open her shirt and bit her breasts while she repeatedly asked
him to stop.149
Justice James McKay found that the Crown had failed to prove lack of consent beyond a reasonable
doubt. He went on to note that, had he been satisfied regarding lack of consent, he would have acquitted
on the basis of honest but mistaken belief in (communicated) consent. The complainant and accused had
exchanged sexually graphic digital communications. These communications extended over the course of
more than a year. None of the communications relied on by the trial judge, including those most proximate
143
144
145
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AE 2021, supra note 25 at para 99.
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 147.
See Barton, supra note 54 at para 99 (“[b]road advance consent refers to the legally erroneous notion that the
complainant agreed to future sexual activity of an undefined scope”). See JA, supra note 10 at paras 44–48.
As summarized in JA, the definition of “consent” under section 273.1(1) “suggests that the consent of the complainant
must be specifically directed to each and every sexual act, negating the argument that broad advance consent is what
Parliament had in mind,” and “this Court has also interpreted this provision as requiring the complainant to consent to
the activity ‘at the time it occur[s]’” (para 34, citing Ewanchuk, supra note 54 at para 26). Thus, a belief that the
complainant gave broad advance consent to sexual activity of an undefined scope will afford the accused no defence, as
that belief is premised on a mistake of law, not fact.
Testimony of Complainant,” supra note 33 at 11h:38min.
Nor would the accused be entitled to rely on her lack of resistance or failure to protest loud enough for him to hear, or his
proclaimed lack of physical violence and threat, as the basis for an honest but mistaken belief that she had communicated
consent through words or actions.
MS, supra note 25.
Ibid at paras 7–8.
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to the incident, involved discussion of the specific acts engaged in by the accused during the alleged sexual
assault or where or when they were to occur.150 Nor did these text messages discuss how consent to being
kissed, pushed, and bitten would be communicated between the two.151 Justice McKay reasoned:
“Normally, Ms. L.’s indication to Mr. M.S in the barn to stop would obligate him to do so. However, this
case is unusual on its facts.”152 He pointed to “the totality of the communications between the parties in
which they both, over the course of more than one year, expressed an interest in having a sexual
relationship with each other. Both parties expressed a strong interest in violent sex, including rape
fantasies.”153 The complainant had told the accused that she would never tell him she “want[ed] it” and
that she would tease him until the end.154 Justice McKay relied on this exchange (which again, did not
address specific sexual acts or a time, location, or mode of communication for any specific acts) for his
conclusion that the accused may have had an honest but mistaken belief in (communicated) consent.
Justice McKay’s reasoning appears to ignore the fact that the complainant also told the accused that she
knew he was unhealthy for her and that she should avoid him; that she meant it when she told him to stop
on an earlier occasion; that she did not know whether she wanted to be close to the accused; that she did
not know if she would like it if he was rough with her; and that she did not want to play rough with him.155
The reasoning in Hunter (and the obiter in M.S.) can be helpfully contrasted with the analysis in R. v
MacMillan.156 MacMillan is a recent Ontario decision rejecting the accused’s application to introduce the
complainant’s prior statements to the accused indicating her interest in S/M. In excluding this evidence,
Justice Michael Dambrot stated: “Undoubtedly, as a matter of law, consent must be specifically renewed,
and communicated, for each sexual act, and the proposition that the complainant could give broad advance
consent to whatever the accused wanted to do to her is a mistake of law.”157
Similarly, in R. v Davidson, the complainant testified that she had consented to vaginal intercourse
and “knew that spanking” would be a part of the interaction.158 The accused told her he wanted to choke
her during the sexual contact. She did not respond. While engaged in vaginal intercourse, he placed his
arm around her neck in a choke hold. In explaining his decision to convict in Davidson, Justice Gregory
Rideout stated: “[T]here would be a clear obligation on the accused to ensure that before he performed the
choking and strangulation actions on D.B. that she was fully informed of what he was going to do and that
he had her express consent to engage in such activity. He did not do so.”159
Notions of consent to a sexual construct invite judges to rely on their own “common sense” to
adjudicate an allegation of harmful sexual behaviour. Even if it were not an error of law, relying on the
type of reasoning used in Hunter – specifically, this idea of consent to the “BDSM construct” – leads to
150
151
152
153
154

155
156
157

158
159

Ibid at paras 35–53.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 109.
Ibid at para 110.
Ibid at para 37: “Mr. S: oh come onnnnn baby you know you want it. Ms. L: You want me to admit it daddy? Hmm?
Because I won’t, you’ll never hear me say I want it. Because as soon as I do you’ll have the reassurance to go ahead, I
won’t give it to you. I’ll tease you till the end daddy, because we know that’s what YOU really want.”
MS, supra note 25 at paras 35–53.
Macmillan, supra note 24.
Ibid at para 19.
Davidson, supra note 24 at para 21.
Ibid at para 167.
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inconsistency and unpredictability in the law and risks unjust, stereotype infused legal reasoning. Any
individual judge is likely to have a different view of what falls within the “scope” of a particular sexual
“construct.” For example, how might a court discern what falls within the “heterosexual construct”? Given
that many heterosexuals engage in anal sex,160 should consent to a “heterosexual governed sexual
experience” include anal penetration? What about a supposed “leather fetish construct” or a “gay bear
construct”?
To further problematize the Court’s reliance in Hunter on this so-called BDSM construct, S/M
practitioners would surely argue that their sexualities are not confined to a singular construct. Moreover,
some of these “constructs” replicate real world gender, race, and class inequalities. As already explained,
invoking the notion that one consents to a sexual construct invites judicial reliance on implied consent.
Reliance on implied consent opens the door to reasoning based on stereotypes and discriminatory social
assumptions.
To repeat, under Canadian sexual assault law one consents to sexual acts, not sexual constructs. An
accused who seeks exoneration on the basis of an honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent
must point to some evidence to support a belief that consent was communicated for the particular sexual
act at issue at the time the act occurred. That there was a general agreement in advance to engage in a
S/M-themed threesome does not change this requirement.
D. The Reasonable Steps Requirement Must Be Understood in the Context, Not of S/M, but of the
Specific Incident
The defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent is only available to an accused if
there is evidence that he took reasonable steps in the circumstances known to him to ascertain that the
complainant was consenting.161 What did the Court in Hunter rely upon as evidence that the accused took
reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant’s consent to place his had around her throat, partially
constricting her breathing, in order to assert his “total control” over her while he penetrated her vagina
with his penis?162 Justice Duncan pointed to her advance agreement to participate in a “BDSM governed
experience,”163 and her consensual participation in intercourse with the accused and a variety of sexual
acts with S.D. in front of the accused.164 In other words, this aspect of his decision relies on the
combination of the complainant’s supposed broad, advance consent and her participation in other
consensual sexual acts. As previously explained, and as highlighted in Barton, “it is an error of law – not
fact – to assume that unless and until a woman says ‘no’, she has implicitly given her consent to any and
all sexual activity.”165 Securing broad, advance consent to participate in a S/M scene does not constitute
reasonable steps for purposes of raising an honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent defence.
160
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See Kimberly R McBride & J Dennis Fortenberry, “Heterosexual Anal Sexuality and Anal Sex Behaviors: A Review”
(2010) 47:2–3 J Sex Research 123; Jami Leichliter et al, “Prevalence and Correlates of Heterosexual Anal and Oral Sex
in Adolescents and Adults in the United States” (2007) 15 J Infectious Diseases 196; Jami Leichliter, “Heterosexual Anal
Sex: Part of an Expanding Sexual Repertoire?” (2008) 35:11 Sexually Transmitted Diseases 910.
See Criminal Code, supra note 109, s 27.
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 55.
See ibid at para 181.
See ibid at para 183.
Barton, supra note 54 at para 98.
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There is an additional problem with this aspect of the decision in Hunter. The trial judge’s assertion
that the complainant knew and agreed to participate in a “BDSM governed sexual experience”166 in an
unfamiliar place with unfamiliar people167 raises the spectre of discriminatory and victim-blaming
attitudes about women who make so called “risky choices” – such as to consume alcohol, dress
provocatively, allow themselves to be alone with men, or, as in this case, agree to a threesome in a remote
location with an individual she did not know.168 For example, Justice Duncan’s comment that A.G.
“showed considerable determination to make her way to Cow Bay”169 may suggest a perception that she
was, to borrow from arguments advanced by Elizabeth Sheehy, Isabel Grant, and Lise Gotell, “‘up for
anything’ and presumed to be consenting.”170
Later in the reasonable steps analysis in Hunter, the trial judge explicitly assigned blame to the
complainant, referring to the three parties’ “mutual failure” to set a safe word and stating that “[a]ll three
of the participants were unwise to not set more specific boundaries of permissible conduct.”171 This is not
how the law of sexual assault in Canada works. The complainant did not repeatedly choke Hunter by
shoving her genitals so far down his throat that his face turned red, his eyes watered, and he gagged and
panicked, unable to breathe.172 The complainant did not, while penetrating him, grab a sensitive part of
his body and squeeze “incredibly hard [to] the point where it was painful” and may have caused
bruising.173 The complainant did not place her hands around the accused’s neck and partially constrict his
breathing to demonstrate her total control while penetrating him.
While S/M proponents would argue that careful negotiation and open and genuine communication is
the social responsibility of all S/M participants,174 from a legal perspective, this was not the accused and
the complainant’s “mutual failure.”175 An individual who chokes a woman by repeatedly pushing his penis
down her throat or squeezes a woman’s breasts “incredibly hard”176 or partially strangles her by placing
his hand around her throat while penetrating her vagina is legally obligated to take reasonable steps to
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Hunter, supra note 22 at para 181.
While she had previously communicated with the accused through a form of text messaging, and there was some
suggestion she had previously met him, he was relatively unknown to her. Indeed, as noted, she did not even know his
real name at the time of the incident. Testimony of Accused, supra note 31 at 11h:30s.
See Lise Gotell “Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and
Risky Women” (2008) 41:4 Akron L Rev 865.
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 181.
See Elizabeth Sheehy, Isabel Grant & Lise Gotell, “The Misogyny of the So Called ‘Rough Sex’ Defence,” Policy
Options (31 January 2020), online: <policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/january-2020/the-misogyny-of-the-so-calledrough-sex-defence/>.
Hunter, supra note 22 at para 185. At another point in his decision, he asserts that “the failure of all three participants to
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ensure that this woman is communicating her contemporaneous consent to such acts. Moreover, what is
required in terms of reasonable steps depends on the circumstances. The circumstances here involved a
man partially strangling a woman who did not even know his real name.177 An individual who engages in
such acts without taking reasonable steps takes the risk that they are sexually assaulting this woman.
In Hunter, the legal obligation to take reasonable steps to ascertain that the complainant was
communicating consent before engaging in these violent acts lay exclusively with the accused. To instead
attribute any blame to the recipient of this violence because she failed to sufficiently negotiate a safe word
is intensely unjust. It is also legally incorrect. As a legal matter, any “mutual failure” in this case was the
mistake of law made by the accused and affirmed by the Court.178
Maneesha Deckha notes that proponents of S/M assert that it is marked by “extensive consultation and
contracting beforehand and respect of boundaries during the power play.”179 Reasonable steps in Hunter
required detailed discussion, very proximate in time to the incident, confirming that the complainant
wanted the accused to engage in each of these acts, discussion and agreement on how consent would be
communicated for each of these acts during the “scene,” confirming that the complainant had capacity to
provide consent both during this discussion and during the “scene,” and agreement on some form of
contemporaneous confirmation by the accused of ongoing consent based on the complainant’s words or
actions during each of these acts.
V. CONCLUSION
An assessment of what constitutes reasonable steps such that an accused might avail himself of the
defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent must account for the circumstances in
which the incident of sexual assault is alleged to have occurred. Hunter involved a complainant, with a
hearing disability, who took a bus from the city where she lived to a mobile home in a wooded area in a
rural part of Nova Scotia where she had never been, at night, in the winter.180 She had no way to leave this
location without the accused (who had not told her whose residence they were at) and did not even know
the accused’s real name.181
Without discussion of what acts the complainant was willing to engage in, and how consent to engage
in them would be contemporaneously communicated, the significantly larger accused in Hunter choked
this woman repeatedly with his penis, wrenched her breast painfully, and placed his hand around her throat
while penetrating her vagina with his penis. The Court’s application of the law to these facts was almost
exclusively focused on what Logan Hunter desired, perceived, and thought reasonable. This occurred at
both the actus reus and mens rea stages of the analysis.
The complainant in this case appears to have been seeking some form of sexual pleasure for the sake
of pleasure. She was not bound by the shackles of domestic obligation, gendered economic power
differentials or love narratives. When she boarded the bus to Cow Bay, she left a boyfriend waiting for
her at home. A.G.’s initial consent cannot be questioned by challenges to legal liberalism based on
177
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women’s lack of choice. This was not a decision forced by a familial power imbalance or economic
vulnerability. Indeed, the complainant may have been disbelieved by the Court and arguably held
responsible for her own victimization, precisely because this was, at the outset, an exercise of choice on
her part.
The law of consent must not be applied in a manner that permits any form of exceptionalism for sexual
acts that are perceived as being outside the mainstream. This is true not only because such judicial
perceptions are unreliable but because any tendency to orient the application of the doctrine of consent to
perceptions of the normal is susceptible to reasoning based on stereotype. Reasoning based on stereotype
inevitably fails to protect the sexual integrity of women who turn to the criminal justice system to respond
to experiences of harmful sexual behaviour.
Judges who avoid relying on “common sense” or their own incomplete knowledge of S/M practices to
assess a complainant’s credibility, and who apply the doctrine of consent and mistaken belief in
communicated consent rigorously and strictly in assessing “rough sex defences,” contribute to a legal
landscape that promotes sexual liberty for women. Judicial reasoning that fails in this regard has the
opposite effect. Not only does the latter fail individual complainants, it also makes it less safe, less
possible, for women to pursue self-fulfilment and pleasure through desire in all of its complicated forms.
If legal feminists are to follow Franke’s appeal to take up projects beyond the use of “law to tame sexual
danger,”182 if we are to embrace an account of female desire that includes contradictions, complexity, and
the erotic potential of loss of control, trial judges must do much better than what occurred in cases like
Hunter (or A.E.183 or M.S.184).
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